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Abstract
Despite much analysis of the rise of the middle class, little is known about the effects of an expanding middle class 
on the poorest in society. In the late 19th century, Europe’s middle class played a critical role in the creation of so-
cial protections aimed at reducing poverty and shielding vulnerable groups from shocks. This was achieved when a 
political alliance was formed between the working poor and white-collar professionals—a “red-white” alliance. We 
examine the role of the middle class and social spending on the extreme poor using data covering a range of early- 
and late-industrializing countries between 1870 and the present. We find that poverty reduction occurs alongside 
a growing middle class, mediated in part through greater spending on health, education, and welfare, but that 
the effect of such social spending on poverty diminishes as the middle class expands. We then examine various 
components of the current social safety net in developing countries and find that, while targeted transfers to the 
poor are associated with a larger middle class, social insurance benefits that accrue to the upper quintiles increase 
three times as quickly. Given that antipoverty policies are not likely to be sustained without the tacit support of the 
middle class, a central implication of our findings is that developing countries aiming to eradicate extreme poverty 
will need to focus on raising the volume of social assistance in a package with universal programs designed so as 
to cover groups in nonstandard jobs. 
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INTRODUCTION
Does an expanding middle class benefit society’s poorest? Much has been written recently about 
the rapid growth of the middle class as well as the 
rapid fall in absolute poverty (Kharas 2017; Kochar 
and Oates 2015; Burrows 2015). However, few stud-
ies seek to link these two trends. It is worth empha-
sizing at the outset that a growing middle class and 
a falling poverty rate are not simply two sides of the 
same coin; there is a large “vulnerable” (or near poor) 
cohort between the poorest individuals and the middle 
class. Additionally, the trends can be quite different. 
In the United States, for example, the percentage of 
middle-class households has steadily fallen since the 
1970s, while the portion of households in the low-
est income brackets has remained steady (Kochhar, 
Fry, and Rohal 2015). Similar trends have occurred 
in the European Union since the early 2000s (ILO 
2015). By contrast, in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
America, most of those lifted out of poverty appear to 
have joined the ranks of the vulnerable rather than the 
middle class (Calvo-Gonzalez 2017; Chandy 2015). 
There, the middle class has stagnated despite reduc-
tions in poverty.
In richer nations, the industrial revolution that shaped 
the political identity of the working poor also gave 
rise to a strata of salaried professionals who helped 
administer the private and public services that sup-
ported manufacturing and urbanization—the so-called 
“middling sort” (Hunt 1996). This middle class formed 
political alliances with the working poor against pre-
dominantly rural elites, and was largely responsible 
for, among other achievements, the expansion of the 
voting franchise (Moore 1966; Lang 1999; Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2005), the legalization of trade unions 
(Pelling 1963), and ultimately, the creation of the mod-
ern welfare state (Hay 1975; Esping-Andersen 1990). 
We examine the effect of the rise and evolution of 
the middle class on extreme poverty, using the World 
Bank’s international poverty line of $1.90 per per-
son per day in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP)-
adjusted terms. Like the definition of poverty, the 
definition of the middle class used here is also set in 
absolute terms, comprising households where per cap-
ita income or consumption lies between $11 and $110 
per person per day in 2011 PPP terms—referred to as 
a “global,” as opposed to national, definition of the mid-
dle class (Kharas, 2017). We argue that middle-class 
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expansion initially is pro-poor given the incentives of 
the emerging middle class and the working poor to co-
operate on matters of social policy. As citizens join the 
ranks of the middle class, they lobby for programs that 
provide them income stability and protections against 
shocks (social insurance). By allying with the working 
poor who seek social assistance (income transfers), 
middle-class constituents increase their bargaining 
power relative to elites who seek labor flexibility and 
lower taxes in a competitive global economy. Over 
time, however, as the middle class prospers and ac-
quires greater political influence, the balance of pro-
grams shifts increasingly toward social insurance and 
away from social assistance. In this way, the middle 
class begins to capture an increasing proportion of the 
benefits of social spending, leaving less for welfare 
services targeted exclusively at the poorest. One im-
plication of this is that the emerging middle class has 
never been truly progressive, because progressivity 
ultimately comes at its own expense.
We attempt three separate, but related tasks. First, we 
investigate the effect of the middle class on the degree 
of extreme poverty across countries and over time. 
Second, we estimate the mediating effect of the middle 
class on poverty through social spending and through 
social policy choices regarding citizen eligibility for 
benefits. Third, we examine the effect of middle-class 
size on the size and distribution of benefits per capita 
of social assistance and social insurance programs in 
developing countries.
Examining cross-country, time-series (unbalanced) 
data covering more than 100 countries from 1870 to 
the present, we find a strong effect of the middle class 
on poverty, even correcting for country income levels, 
but this effect has diminished over time. Today’s rich 
countries had far lower levels of poverty between 1870 
and 1920 than today’s developing countries have, 
even though per capita income levels are roughly 
equivalent. We also find evidence that the middle-class 
impact on poverty reduction is both direct and medi-
ated through social spending, but the marginal effect of 
the latter declines as middle-class size expands, with 
social spending having no marginal effect on poverty 
reduction once the size of the middle class approaches 
30 percent of the population. On average, half of the 
total effect of middle-class size on poverty is mediated 
through social spending. 
Turning to an analysis of current developing countries 
since 2000, we find that the dollar benefits available to 
the poorest quintile within each country get larger in the 
presence of a larger middle class. In contrast, the size 
of absolute benefits to those in the top quintile (which 
usually includes most of the middleclass households in 
a developing country context) that is about three times 
as great as the poorest quintile, suggesting that the 
middle class is capturing significantly greater benefits 
from national social spending programs than are the 
poor. Our results highlight the politically pivotal role that 
the middle class plays in supporting the expansion of 
social protection—and thus the need for cross-class 
solidarity—but also illustrates the disproportionate in-
fluence of the middle class in shaping a country’s social 
protection regime. A major conclusion is that it is criti-
cally important to distinguish between social assistance 
and social insurance. In most countries, assistance 
programs are funded at relatively modest rates and pro-
gressivity is modest. Social insurance tends to be more 
universal in terms of coverage (and enjoys stronger 
political support from the middle class) and dispenses 
far larger amounts of money, but benefits are strongly 
oriented toward the richest quintiles.1 Our analysis sug-
gests that increasing the volume of resources going 
toward social assistance and altering the design and re-
gressivity of social insurance are the policy areas most 
likely to benefit the poor.
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POVERTY, WELFARE, AND SOCIAL 
CLASS
Attention to social protection as an area of devel-opment policy is relatively new. During adjust-
ment programs in the 1980s and 1990s, efforts were 
principally focused on the appropriate mix of policies 
to achieve stabilization and reform, with comparatively 
little attention paid to the problem of social costs and 
risks to vulnerable groups (Graham 2002). Even where 
issues of social welfare were addressed, the focus 
tended to be on short-term consequences of public 
sector retrenchment (see, e.g., Galal, et al. 1994). 
Since the early 2000s, however, developing countries 
have expanded their safety nets to include almost 2 
billion people (World Bank 2015).
Two distinguishing features of advice given to develop-
ing countries on the design of social protection can be 
contrasted with the practice in advanced, industrialized 
countries (Barrientos 2010). First, social protection in 
developing countries has often had a stronger “target-
ing” preference toward the poorest rather than featuring 
the universality of richer countries that aim to protect liv-
ing standards of their workforce. Second, social protec-
tion in developing countries tends to be complex, and 
fragmentary, with the average developing country now 
having over 20 distinct social programs, each aimed at 
a different sub-population (World Bank 2015). 
While the development of large-scale social protec-
tion may be relatively recent in developing countries, 
this is not the case in most developed nations, where 
the creation of universal forms of social protection oc-
curred at early stages of development and state forma-
tion. Indeed, one of the innovations of the European 
Enlightenment was that poverty should not be thought 
of as a necessary condition for economic development 
to occur. As Ravallion has argued, under mercantilist 
principles, it was widely accepted that the afflictions of 
extreme poverty were needed to encourage industri-
ousness, a mindset that the Enlightenment sought to 
change: “The key contribution… was in establishing 
the moral case for the idea of public effort toward elim-
inating poverty” (Ravallion 2013). For the better part 
of a century, that “public effort” largely took the form of 
mutual aid societies, the workhouse, as well as com-
pulsory education laws. It did not include any form of 
protection against shocks or any social “floor,” however.
Class and Social Protection: Some 
Stylized Facts from European History
Much has been written about the class-origins of the 
European welfare state and the political alliances that 
undergird them (Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1985; 
Baldwin 1990; Esping-Andersen 1992). Most critical 
for poverty reduction is the nature of the alliance that 
incorporated the working poor, since as a constituency, 
they were too weak to impose their will unilaterally on 
others. In this regard, the middle class has historically 
proven to be a pivotal group in facilitating the develop-
ment of social policy. In 19th century Britain, the essay-
ist William Carpenter argued in his address to workers:
“[T]he middle classes are not only not a class 
of persons having interests different from your 
own… they are not a different class from your 
own. They are the same class; they are, gener-
ally speaking, working or laboring men” (1831).
In Scandinavian countries, the establishment of so-
cial protections such as pensions resulted from the 
famous “red-green” alliance of urban workers and the 
rural middle class—a coalition that, in Sweden, thwarted 
legislation until they were granted a pension law 
extending benefits to all citizens. As industrialization and 
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urbanization proceeded, white-collar professionals who 
formed a “red-white alliance” gradually replaced farmers in 
the alliance (Pempel 1998: 207). In subsequent decades, 
this (often-uneasy) alliance remained powerful enough to 
fight against predominantly rural, aristocratic elites.
Because the middle-class valued stability, its interests 
coincided with those of the working class; social “pro-
tection”—the collection of policies designed to reduce 
poverty and vulnerability by limiting people’s expo-
sure to risk—was used to tamp down radicalization 
and social upheaval among the industrial workforce 
and its accompanying political movements—socialist 
parties and revolutionary communes. Between 1883 
and 1889, largely with middle-class support and the 
support of “bourgeois parties” against a social-dem-
ocratic threat, Bismarck’s government enacted three 
basic components of social protection: healthcare 
(1883), accident insurance (1884), and unemployment 
and old age pensions (1889) (Blackbourn and Evans, 
2014; Spohn 1991; Holborn 1969). Similarly, France 
established free medical assistance and support pro-
grams for the elderly in the 1890s.2 Facing similar 
trade union mobilization and electoral threats from the 
newly formed Labour Party, the governing Liberals in 
Britain established worker pensions, unemployment, 
and health insurance between 1906 and 1911. In each 
case, these programs were universal and, as we shall 
show below, a feature that ultimately allowed the mid-
dle-class to capture the lion’s share of the monetary 
benefits.
The Limits to Cross-Class Solidarity
The working poor are not the only group with an inter-
est in expanding social insurance. As Baldwin put it, 
“[T]he proletariat has had no monopoly on uncertainty 
or on an interest to ameliorate such circumstances” 
(1990: 12). The middle class are also predisposed 
to supporting social insurance against risk, but their 
demands for social policy do not always match the 
preferences of the working poor. For example, wher-
ever they appeared, the new middle classes enjoyed 
a relatively privileged position in the workforce, and 
thus full employment for them was a “peripheral con-
cern” while it was of central importance for the working 
class (Esping-Andersen 1992: 31). While middle-class 
groups had incentives to ally with the poor to obtain 
larger welfare state protections, they also resisted ef-
forts to expand non-contributory, pro-poor programs 
financed out of taxes, pushing instead for contributory 
schemes in which they were participants. 
Consequently, in each period of red-white solidarity, 
tensions inevitably appeared between the universal-
ism preferred by the middle classes and the more 
progressive demands of the working poor. In Germany 
following the Second World War, for example, alliance 
between the middle class and working class splin-
tered over means testing of unemployment assistance 
(Mares 2003). In Britain, the red-white coalition broke 
apart following the First World War, when Labour as-
cendancy created divisions within the Liberal Party 
over the role of trade unions funding political parties, 
as well as social programs that targeted the increas-
ingly vocal working poor. In The Strange Death of 
Liberal England, Dangerfield wrote of the middle-class 
reaction to David Lloyd George’s support of reforms to 
the Health Insurance Act:
“[H]e represented—or seemed to represent—
all those dangerous and possibly subversive 
opinions which Liberalism, in its grave game 
of progress, was forced to tolerate… If his con-
victions had been otherwise than emotional, 
he would have been a Socialist by this time” 
(Dangerfield 1935: 29).
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The story of welfare state building in industrialized na-
tions, in sum, is that policymakers strove to dampen 
social unrest through the extension of benefits to the 
working poor, but at the same time, to accommodate 
the needs of the growing middle class by providing ser-
vices for which they would be willing to pay taxes. The 
middle classes—initially including farmers, artisans, 
clerks, shopkeepers, and managers—each facing their 
own unique vulnerabilities, also had pressing needs 
for social protection, and the red-white alliance guar-
anteed the political success of those protections. With 
middle-class expansion, however, policy differences 
within the red-white alliance widened, with the middle 
class resisting most programs aimed at more dramatic 
income redistribution.
Implications
One of the enduring puzzles in the development of 
social protection around the world is the divergence 
between welfare-state development in high-income 
OECD, when contrasted with developing countries in 
this regard (Rudra 2003; 2010). Social protection in 
low- and middle-income countries today has evolved in 
an environment in which labor movements have found 
themselves in a weaker bargaining position relative to 
the emerging middle class. For developing nations with 
large surpluses of low-skilled labor, global pressures 
for lower unit-labor costs and, in many countries, re-
pressive policies toward organized labor in the face of 
capital mobility, have left workers in a weaker relative 
bargaining position (Rodrik 1999; Bellin 2000; Berliner 
et al., 2015). Many workers end up in non-standard 
jobs, often in the informal sector (Auer 2006).3 Another 
feature of developing countries is sharp sectoral cleav-
ages between workers within sectors facing shocks—
e.g., manufacturing sectors exposed to international 
competition—relative to workers in more protected 
sectors. Distributional conflict between high- and low-
risk sectors, rather than between classes, has led both 
workers and middle-class members facing high volatil-
ity to support social insurance programs that compen-
sate them for losses of income (Zeitinoglu, et al. 2000). 
Meanwhile, workers and the middle class in low-risk 
sectors (such as teachers and nurses in the public 
sector) have opposed the programs that turn them into 
subsidizers of high-risk sectors (Mares 2005). 
The size of the middle class has two effects—direct 
and indirect—on poverty. The direct effects reflect the 
composition and structure of the economy. Comparing 
two countries with the same income levels, the one 
with the larger middle class would have lower poverty 
because the middle class would be a source of en-
trepreneurship and small enterprise creation, result-
ing in opportunities for more employment and higher 
wages. Similarly, middle-class consumption contrib-
utes to aggregate demand and more economic growth. 
Additionally, improvements in agricultural productivity 
on the part of middle-class family farmers can result in 
lower food prices paid by the poorest. 
The indirect effects take place through middle-class ef-
forts to expand the social protection regime. It follows 
that cross-class alliances supporting expanded social 
protection are also more likely in countries where 
the middle class has significant political influence. 
Marginalized groups may be critical political allies for 
middle-class groups vying for benefits. For the poorest 
citizens, middle-class allies are needed to maintain 
critical support for social programs. As the middle class 
expands, however, we expect the red-white alliance to 
fray for two reasons. First, as additional programs are 
added to the social protection regime, there is a nat-
ural tendency for social planners, in order to restrain 
costs, to shift toward means-testing or other forms of 
targeting of social assistance programs in order to sep-
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arate the non-poor from the poor. These programs then 
quickly lose the political support of the middle class, 
who have little stake in policies from which they de-
rive little benefit and become quantitatively modest in 
size (Besley and Kanbur 1990; Gelbach and Pritchett 
2002). Second, there is a parallel tendency for mid-
dle-class groups, as their political weight increases, 
to rely less on their solidarity with the poor, and to 
capture a larger share of the benefits of social policies 
by placing a greater emphasis on contributory social 
insurance programs. 
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MEASUREMENT AND DATA
The Middle Class and the Extreme 
Poor
E. P. Thompson’s classic, The Making of the English Working Class, argued that class forma-
tion was inextricably linked to emerging occupational 
categories and the risks they faced (1964). In fact, 
just as the industrial revolution sharpened the political 
identity of the working poor, it also catalyzed the rapid 
expansion of the middle class. As a social category, 
the “middling sort” always referred to a broad band of 
the population, but this diversity increased following 
industrialization. The period saw a rise in small en-
trepreneurs, retail merchants, clerks, managers, and 
salaried professionals to staff banks, insurance firms, 
shipping companies, and railways. Industrialization 
also saw the massive expansion of municipal and local 
governments to manage growing cities, providing oc-
cupations for civil servants, teachers, nurses, doctors, 
lawyers, and public officials.
Although the middle class is usually thought of in so-
cio-political terms, we rely on an economic definition 
to measure its size, given that a defining feature of 
middle-class status is a certain degree of economic 
stability and resilience to shocks. Following Kharas 
(2017), we define the middle class as those living on 
between $11 and $110 a day (all figures in 2011 PPP 
terms, equivalent to the more commonly used $10 to 
$100 in 2005 PPP terms).4 The key difference between 
our approach and that of others is the use of an abso-
lute band, common across countries, rather than a rel-
ative band (e.g. middle three quintiles). Among others 
using an absolute band, our upper threshold of $110/
day is higher compared to, e.g., the $50/day threshold 
used by Ferreira, et al. (2013), López-Calva and Ortiz-
Juarez (2011), and Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002). This 
higher threshold is consistent with the idea of a “global” 
definition of the middle class, namely, households that 
have similar access to a basket of consumption goods 
regardless of where they live. In choosing the upper 
threshold, we note that in 2010, the average U.S. 
per-capita daily income was $98.77; at least some 
members of a “global” middle class should be able to 
enjoy the same purchasing power that the average 
American holds.
For the “extreme poor” we rely on the World Bank’s 
definition—the so-called “dollar-per-day” threshold. 
In 2015, following 2011 PPP adjustments, the global 
extreme-poverty line was raised to $1.90 per day. The 
new line preserves the real purchasing power of the 
previous line (of $1.25 a day in 2005 prices) in the 
world’s poorest countries. 
We first assemble data on the share of total income 
accruing to each centile of the population for each 
country for which data are available and use this to es-
timate the middle-class headcount. Our data are from 
the World Bank’s global poverty monitoring PovCalNet 
database (for 1990 onwards), and Bourguignon and 
Morrison (2002) (for distributions in the period 1870 
to 1990). The data between surveys is interpolated to 
reflect the path of real household expenditure (where 
available) or of GDP growth. Sources for this are the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators measure 
of household expenditure in 2011 PPP terms, and the 
Maddison Project database (Bolt and van Zanden 
2014). We also use population data from the Maddison 
Project and from the U.N. Population Division. 
From these data, we generate a distribution of income 
and consumption shares for all countries for which 
they are available, covering 1820-2015. Following 
Datt (1998) we then transform these distributions into 
parameterized, beta Lorenz curves for each country. 
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These parameters are then used to calculate both the 
share of the middle class ($11 to $110) and of the ex-
treme poor (<$1.90) in the population. Full details on 
the methodology used to calculate the middle class 
and the extreme poor are in the appendix.
Figure 1 shows the trends for the size of the middle 
class, and the percent of extreme poor in the popula-
tion, between 1870 and 2000 for current OECD and 
non-OECD countries. Both have seen rapid expansion 
in the middle class and falls in extreme poverty. The 
middle class surpassed the poor in advanced, indus-
trialized nations in about 1920, but this crossover has 
only happened very recently in developing countries, 
within the past decade. For comparison, we add the 
percentage of agricultural land held as family farms 
from Vanhannen (1997; 2005). This has been used 
elsewhere as an historic proxy for the size of the mid-
dle class (Boix 2003; Easterly 2007; Houle 2009). Our 
measure of the middle class mostly conforms to the 
family farms measure across OECD and non-OECD 
countries, although the percentage of family farms 
does appear to “top out” at approximately 65 percent in 
OECD countries and at about 40 percent in developing 
countries.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between extreme pov-
erty rates and GDP per capita for advanced and devel-
oping countries, at equivalent income levels, smoothed 
over five year periods. The data in span country-years 
between 1820 and 2015. The first graph indicates that, 
at every level of per-capita income, today’s developing 
countries have rates of extreme poverty that are 5-10 
percentage points higher than today’s rich countries. 
This gap can be seen—dramatically, in some cases—in 
the bottom graph, which compares five richer and five 
poorer countries. Once again poorer nations consis-
tently suffer from higher rates of extreme poverty than 
OECD counterparts at each comparable income level 
(with the exception of China and India in earlier years). 
Social Protection
We assemble two datasets—one historical, another 
contemporary. For the historical data, we rely on: (i) 
benchmark data on social spending across a number 
of countries from 1880 to 1930, as detailed in Lindert 
(2004); (ii) OECD data on social spending covering 
OECD countries between 1930 and 1980; (iii) OECD 
data on social spending—with adjustments to the 
Figure 1. The Middle Class and Extreme Poverty, 1870 – 2010
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methodology used for the 1930-1980 data, covering 
OECD countries from 1960 to the present; and (iv) 
the World Bank’s data on social spending comprising 
public health, education, and welfare expenditures, be-
tween 1960 and 2000.
Our contemporary data relies on the World Bank’s 
Atlas of Social Protection—Indicators of Resilience and 
Equity (ASPIRE) database for indicators of social pro-
tection, covering a sporadic number of years between 
2004 and 2011. We rely on a simple measure of total 
expenditure on all forms of social protection, as well as 
measures of coverage of various components of social 
protection, i.e., the percentage of population participat-
ing in social protection and labor programs (including 
direct and indirect beneficiaries) by program type. 
Programs are divided into social assistance and social 
insurance. Social assistance consists of non-contrib-
utory programs that generally involve transfers tar-
geted toward the poor, such as cash transfers, in-kind 
provisions, subsidies, fee waivers, (non-contributory) 
pensions, as well as public works and workfare. By 
contrast, social insurance refers to contributory pro-
grams aimed at reducing exposure to risks, including 
old age, survivors’, and disability pensions, along with 
employment-related benefits such as paid leave for 
sickness, parental benefits, as well as health and inju-
ries benefits. 
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Figure 2. Poverty and Income for OECD and non-OECD Countries
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METHODS AND RESULTS
The data are used to investigate the impact of the mid-
dle class on extreme poverty, mediated through social 
spending. We also review the effect of the middle class 
on the level and composition of social assistance and 
social protection programs.
Our benchmark specifications take a simple interactive 
form:
Hi,t = β0 + β1Hi,t – 1 + β2si,t + β3(Hi,t – 1 × si,t) + 
β4Xi,t + βti,t + εi,t 
P M M 
         (1)
Where HP is the headcount ratio of the extreme poor 
in the population (those with consumption of less than 
$1.90/day in constant 2011 PPP-adjusted dollars). HM 
is the size of the middle class (consumption between 
$11 and $110 per day in constant 2011 PPP-adjusted 
dollars), s is any measure of social protection benefits 
per capita in natural logs, X a vector of controls, and t a 
trend. For controls, we include GDP per capita (also in 
constant PPP-adjusted dollars), total trade (gross im-
ports + exports as a percentage of GDP) as a proxy for 
the effects of greater global integration and openness, 
and a Herfindahl index of ethnolinguistic fractionaliza-
tion , where Fc is the fractionalization score for country 
c, and x is the fraction of ethnic group g in country c, 
on the assumption that ethnic fragmentation can influ-
ence poverty levels. We also include the Polity index of 
democracy, ranging from -10 (autocracy) to +10 (de-
mocracy), to allow for the fact that democratic govern-
ments may be more pro-poor (Ross 2006). As we have 
social spending data from four sources that may have 
differences in coverage, (Lindert 1994, old OECD, 
new OECD, and World Bank), we include dummy vari-
ables for each data source. All variables are indexed 
by country i and time period t, and ε is a random, i.i.d. 
disturbance. We use lustrum (five-year) averages, thus 
each period represents a five-year timespan. We lag 
the middle-class indicator by one five-year period to 
control for potential simultaneity.
We begin with an analysis of long time-span data 
(roughly 1870 to 2015) using pooled ordinary least 
square (OLS) and fixed-effects models with error cor-
rections for contemporaneous and serial autocorrela-
tion, where we model the error term as a first-order 
autocorrelated AR(1) process: εi,t = ρεi,t-1 + μi,t. We also 
estimate a more complex, dynamic-panel model using 
a system-generalized method of moments (GMM) es-
timator that is well suited for persistent cross-country, 
time-series data, and which can also address endog-
eneity concerns regarding some of our independent 
variables. 
Panel Regression Results 
Our benchmark cross-national types of time-series 
panel regression results are presented in Table 1: 
pooled OLS, OLS with fixed effects, and system GMM.5 
In column (1) we show results from a pooled OLS re-
gression with error correction for contemporaneous 
correlation as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995). We 
also structure the within-panel error as an AR(1) pro-
cess to correct for country-specific serial correlation. 
Column (2) shows results from a standard fixed-effects 
regression where the disturbance is, similarly, modeled 
as first-order autoregressive term. Both sets of results 
show that the independent effects of middle-class 
size and per-capita social spending reduce extreme 
poverty. These effects occur across as well as within 
countries over the period. The effect of the interaction 
term combining middle-class size and social spend-
ing, however, is positive on poverty, indicating that the 
negative effect of social protection on poverty reduc-
tion gets smaller as the middle class expands. This 
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interactive relationship is graphically presented in 
Figure 3, in which we can analyze marginal effects 
based on the error-correction regressions in columns 
(1) and (2). The graph on the left is derived from the 
pooled OLS results, while the one on the right is from 
our fixed effects estimates. In both cases, the mar-
ginal effect of social spending per capita on the pov-
erty headcount is negative. However, as the middle 
class approaches 30 percent of the population, the 
effect of social spending on poverty approaches zero. 
Thereafter, the effect reverses itself, although the er-
rors are much larger given the small number of coun-
tries where the middle class is larger than 60 percent.
Other variables behave as expected. Average per-cap-
ita income provides a large-magnitude effect on 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Panel-corrected 
standard errors Fixed effects System GMM
Middle class headcount ratio (% of population) -1.064***(0.134)
-0.565***
(0.103)
-0.955***
(0.145)
Social spending/capita (US$, Ln) -4.574***(0.476)
-2.890***
(0.587)
-5.333***
(1.957)
Middle class × Social spending 0.163***(0.015)
0.091***
(0.012)
0.142***
(0.016)
Polity score -0.102(0.093)
-0.220**
(0.085)
-0.370*
(0.214)
Trade (% of GDP) -0.057**(0.022)
-0.009
(0.024)
-0.073
(0.050)
GDP/capita (US$, Ln) -16.639***(2.211)
-19.205***
(2.535)
-12.858***
(4.131)
Ethnic fractionalization 8.195***
(3.040)
6.302
(5.787)
Trend -0.035(0.022)
0.101***
(0.010)
0.052
(0.062)
N
n
676
111
575
105
676
111
R2
ρ
Country-fixed effects
Region-fixed effects
p > χ2, F
0.804
0.603
no
yes
0.000
0.767
0.691
yes
no
0.000
no
yes
0.000
AR(2) test (p-value)
Hansen’s J (p-value)
  0.738
0.958
Notes:  Dependent variable is share of population living below $1.90/day (2011 PPP-adjusted US$). Estimates are gener-
ated with OLS with errors corrected for contemporaneous correlation and within-panel first-order autocorrelation in paren-
theses in column (1). Column (2) presents results from a within-country estimator (with fixed effects) where the disturbance 
term is first-order autoregressive, and with errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Results from a dynamic 
two-step system-GMM estimation, with robust standard errors in parentheses, are in column (3), with two lags (one and two 
5-year periods). Intercepts are estimated but not reported.  * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 1. Extreme Poverty and the Middle Class, Panel Results
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poverty reduction, and democracy does appear to 
be “good for the poor” in terms of reducing poverty. 
Ethnically fragmented states, by contrast, exhibit 
greater poverty, confirming findings of the past two 
decades linking fractionalization to lower long-term 
growth rates (Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina et al., 
2003). In our first set of results, trade is also associated 
with lower poverty, although this result is not stable 
across specifications; we do not see evidence, how-
ever, that globalization has harmed the poor.
The system-GMM estimator uses lagged values of 
variables in levels as instruments in a first-difference 
equation, along with lagged differences of variables as 
instruments in a levels equation in a system (Arellano 
and Bond 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998; Roodman 
2006). The system-GMM estimator yields efficient es-
timates in the presence of time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity, and provides consistent and unbiased 
estimates in the presence of endogeneity where there 
is a dynamic relationship between current values of 
the explanatory variables and past values of the de-
pendent variable. We allow lags of middle-class size, 
social spending, and the interactive term to enter the 
system-GMM instrument matrix. Our results are in col-
umn (3).6 These results are consistent with the panel 
estimators in the previous columns, showing a strong, 
significant effect of social spending on poverty reduc-
tion, but one that is declining in as the middle class 
expands. AR(2) tests indicate an absence of serial 
correlation in second differences, with which estimates 
would be biased. A second test, the Hansen’s J test of 
over-identifying restrictions does not reject the null of 
the exogeneity of the instruments, indicating that our 
instrument set is valid.
Causal Mediation Analysis
These baseline regressions support the conclusion 
that social spending and middle-class size impact 
poverty levels independently and in combination with 
each other. Our findings of the ameliorative effect of 
social spending on poverty confirm a range of analy-
ses showing welfare gains by the poor from anti-pov-
erty social policy (Barrientos 2013; Lustig et al., 2012; 
Fiszbein, Kanbur, and Yemtsov 2014). However, there 
is extensive historical evidence, as we have seen, of 
the role of the middle class in demanding greater social 
protection for itself. If so, we would need to determine 
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Figure 3. Middle-Class Size and Social Spending, Interactive Effects
Note: 95% confidence intervals
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the extent to which the effect of middle-class size on 
poverty is “mediated” through the social-spending 
channel.
In the classic framework, mediation analysis is con-
ducted in a system of three equations: the outcome is 
regressed on a “treatment” indicator, the mediator is 
regressed on the treatment, and the outcome is then 
regressed on both the treatment and the mediator:7
E(Hi, t |Hi, t–1), Xi, t)
P M  (2)
E(si, t│Hi, t–1, Xi, t)
M  (3)
E(Hi, t│Hi, t–1, si, t, Xi, t)
P M  (4)
where the variables HP, HM, and s, and the vector X are 
identical to those specified in equation (1) above. 
A mediation path, to be valid, requires “sequential ig-
norability”—first, that the treatment is “ignorable” given 
observed confounders and second, that the mediator 
is “ignorable” given both the treatment and confound-
ers. In randomized experiments, of course, the first 
condition is satisfied. In observational analyses, how-
ever, regression techniques requiring control variables 
related to the treatment are required to satisfy this 
assumption. For the second condition, observational 
analyses require controls for variables related to both 
the mediator and the outcome. 
In our example, the first assumption implies that that 
no confounding differences between countries with 
different middle-class sizes exist once controls are in-
cluded to correct for confounding factors. The second 
condition presupposes that different levels of social 
spending occur randomly within groups of countries 
that are roughly similar in terms of middle-class size. 
These conditions, especially the ignorability of the 
mediator, are extremely onerous and can never be 
fully verified with observational data where there are 
multiple potential mediators—some of which may be 
unobserved. Mediation tests constitute the best avail-
able method for investigating causal mechanisms 
in a cross-country context, but sensitivity analysis is 
needed to evaluate the robustness of results to the ex-
istence of such confounders. Imai, et al. (2010) argue, 
given that the errors co-vary across equations (2), (3), 
and (4), a linear system of equations does not satisfy 
the sequential ignorability assumption. As an alterna-
tive, therefore, they rely on the non-parametric tech-
nique that resolves some of the problems surrounding 
the assumptions required to identify causal mecha-
nisms (Imai, et al. 2011).
Our mediation analysis is presented in Table 2, in 
which we consider whether the effect of middle-class 
size is mediated through different channels. The co-
efficients in column (1) are consistent with our base-
line results that middle-class size reduces extreme 
poverty. The average causal mediated effect (ACME) 
and average direct effects (ADE), which represent 
the sample averages of the causal and direct effects, 
respectively, confirm that social policy constitutes an 
important mechanism for poverty reduction. We find 
that over one-half of the effect of middle-class size on 
poverty reduction is mediated through per-capita social 
spending. 
In columns (2) and (3) we analyze the degree of 
universalism in welfare states, measured as an in-
dex representing the legal eligibility of citizens to 
receive benefits in each country for six types of 
benefits: pensions, unemployment compensation, 
maternity, sickness, family allowances, and disabil-
ity (Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2017). This universal 
welfare index is scored from zero to 54 representing 
the sum of all six scores (each is scored from zero 
to 6). The results indicate that universalism is also 
a mediating channel, although the effect is weaker.8 
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But with 20 percent of the middle-class effect on pov-
erty mediated through universalism, it seems as if this 
captures some of the indirect effect of the middle-class 
impact on poverty through social spending. Given that 
universalism is strongly increasing for each country 
over time (as legal changes expand the range of eligi-
ble citizens), we regress universalism on a trend with 
fixed-effects, and generating the residual. This residual 
can be considered a “de-trended” universalism index. 
The de-trended index appears to be identical to the 
regular universalism channel as a mediator, suggest-
ing that the effect is not due to some unobserved, 
temporal factor. Finally, we examine total per-capita 
government expenditures as a channel given that gen-
eral government spending can also affect the level of 
poverty. Expenditures are a weak mediating channel, 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Middle-class size -0.227***(0.045)
-0.550***
(0.043)
-0.550***
(0.043)
-0.499***
(0.034)
Polity -0.417***(0.122)
-0.379***
(0.119)
-0.377***
(0.119)
-0.697***
(0.113)
Ethnic fractionalization 12.226***(2.702)
10.895***
(2.794)
10.819***
(2.793)
14.519***
(2.616)
Trade (% of GDP) -0.018(0.026)
-0.131***
(0.030)
-0.132***
(0.030)
-0.046
(0.029)
GDP/capita (US$, Ln) -10.805**(4.608)
-24.479***
(5.006)
-24.437***
(5.003)
-29.031***
(5.224)
Trend 0.227***(0.034)
0.093***
(0.027)
-0.115***
(0.026)
0.031
(0.023)
Mediator:
Social spending/capita (US$, Ln) -7.358***(0.572)
Universalism index -0.761***(0.091)
De-trended universalism index -0.766***(0.091)
Government revenue (% GDP) 0.217***(0.075)
N 678 887 887 805
R2 0.653 0.522 0.522 0.495
ACME -18.181*** -40.944*** -15.411*** -75.141***
Direct Effect 11.759*** -25.809*** -29.281*** -57.059***
Total Effect -6.422*** -66.754*** -44.692*** -132.200***
Total Effect Mediated 2.831*** 0.613*** 0.345*** 0.568***
Notes: Dependent variable is share of population living below $1.90/day (2011 PPP-adjusted US$). Estimates are from 
linear equations, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Mediating variables for the causal effect of middle class on 
poverty are estimated using the non-parametric procedures described in Imai, et al. (2010). P values for mediating effects 
are derived from 95 percent confidence intervals based on non-parametric bootstrapped errors with 1,000 resamples. 
Intercepts are estimated but not reported.  * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 2. Poverty and the Middle Class, Causal Mediation Analysis
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and explain less than one-tenth of one percent of the 
total middle-class effect.
In Table 3 we examine mediating effects by sub-sam-
ple, spl i t t ing the sample between OECD and 
non-OECD countries, and by democracies and autoc-
racies. We focus on social spending and universalism.9 
The causal mediated effects for both are the largest in 
non-OECD countries and in non-democracies. Over 
60 percent of the effect of middle-class size on poverty 
reduction is mediated in later-industrializing nations, 
while 57 percent of the effect is mediated through so-
cial spending in non-democratic states.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
O
EC
D
N
on
-O
EC
D
D
em
oc
ra
cy
A
ut
oc
ra
cy
O
EC
D
N
on
-O
EC
D
D
em
oc
ra
cy
A
ut
oc
ra
cy
Middle-class 
size
0.118**
(0.049)      
-0.258***
(0.073)
-0.293***
(0.039)
-0.571***
(0.128)
-0.124
(0.102)
-0.756***
(0.060)
-0.506***
(0.038)
-1.164***
(0.089)
Polity score
-0.433***
(0.157)
-0.135
(0.169)
-0.084
(0.186)
-0.094
(0.334)
-0.468*
(0.280)
-0.094
(0.147)
0.425**
(0.195)
-0.816***
(0.235)
Ethnic 
fractionalization
-10.514***
(2.706)
17.897***
(4.126)
13.543***
(2.792)
8.300*
(4.896)
-14.656**
(6.348)
11.187***
(3.328)
17.032***
(3.447)
10.655***
(3.554)
Trade (% GDP)
0.004
(0.018)
-0.092*
(0.048)
0.018
(0.024)
-0.290***
(0.057)
-0.081**
(0.039)
-0.225***
(0.040)
-0.042
(0.031)
-0.262***
(0.043)
GDP/capita 
(US$, Ln)
6.074
(6.726)
-6.531
(6.029)
-17.183***
(5.198)
-14.383*
(7.512)
-6.951
(14.866)
-28.294***
(5.593)
-26.625***
(5.890)
-32.394***
(6.547)
Trend -0.021
(0.042)
0.119
(0.073)
0.229***
(0.034)
-0.381***
(0.112)
-0.212**
(0.095)
-0.037
(0.037)
0.200***
(0.031)
0.062*
(0.036)
Mediator:
Social 
spending/
capita
(US$, Ln)
-5.467***
(0.526)
-8.285***
(0.928)
-4.442***
(0.585)
-10.812***
(1.159)
Universalism 
index
-0.231
(0.150)
-0.888***
(0.124)
-0.538***
(0.089)
-1.096***
(0.151)
N 302 376 417 211 136 621 400 487
R2 0.689 0.626 0.621 0.655 0.608 0.508 0.599 0.486
ACME -18.181*** -40.944*** -15.411*** -75.141*** 2.061 -18.111*** -6.661*** -24.999***
Direct Effect 11.759*** -25.809*** -29.281*** -57.059*** -12.408 -75.628*** -50.588*** -116.373***
Total Effect -6.422 -66.754*** -44.692*** -132.2*** -10.347 -93.739*** -57.249*** -141.372***
Total Effect 
Mediated
2.831 0.613*** 0.345*** 0.568*** -0.199 0.193*** 0.116*** 0.177***
Notes: Dependent variable is share of population living below $1.90/day (2011 PPP-adjusted US$). Estimates are from 
linear equations, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Mediating variables for the causal effect of middle class on 
poverty are estimated using the non-parametric procedures described in Imai, et al. (2010). P values for mediating effects 
are derived from 95 percent confidence intervals based on non-parametric bootstrapped errors with 1,000 resamples. 
Intercepts are estimated but not reported.  * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 3. Poverty and the Middle Class, Causal Mediation Analysis by Sub-Sample
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Sensitivity Analysis
These findings, as indicated, are meant to be suggestive 
of possible causal mechanisms rather than conclusive. 
Sensitivity analysis probes the sequential ignorability 
assumption, evaluates the validity of findings under 
potential violation of the sequential ignorability rule, and 
thus provides benchmarks for interpreting mediation re-
sults causally (Imai et al., 2011). Whenever the assump-
tion is not rejected, estimated mediation effects can be 
interpreted as valid causal mediation effects. If media-
tion results are sensitive, they can change substantially 
when the sequential ignorability assumption is violated. 
The sensitivity parameter ρ (rho), measures the correla-
tion between the errors in the mediation model and the 
error in the outcome model. This correlation arises if 
unobserved confounders affect both mediator and out-
come variables, because these variables are part of the 
two error terms. The sequential ignorability assumption 
implies that ρ equals zero. 
Figure 4 shows the sensitivity of the ACMEs to viola-
tions in sequential ignorability. The mediation effects 
are plotted against deviations in the sensitivity param-
eter from zero. The dashed lines show the ACME as 
estimated. Where the ACME = 0, if |ρ| is large, then 
the implication is that some unobserved confounder is 
biasing the ACME estimate. We see in all graphs, that 
where ACME = 0, ρ is between 0.10 and 0.40—indi-
cating relatively good sensitivity to violations in critical 
conditions for valid causality.
Determinants of Current Social 
Protection in Developing Countries
Our analyses indicate that social policy plays a criti-
cal role in the effect of middle-class size on poverty. 
Our panel results combined with our causal-mediation 
analysis, moreover, raises the question of whether 
the types of social policies—and the specific social 
program expenditures associated—are differentially 
influenced by middle-class size. To what extent does 
the expansion of the middle class benefit the poorest 
in terms of social benefits? More importantly, to what 
extent is the middle class capturing a greater share 
of those benefits? To examine these effects more di-
rectly, we turn to an investigation of more recent social 
protection measures in developing countries. From the 
World Bank’s Atlas of Social Protection, we can esti-
mate the effects of middle-class size on the distribution 
of the benefits of social protection by quintile. Figure 5 
shows the distribution of benefits from two types of so-
cial programs, social “insurance,” covering programs 
that minimize the negative impact of economic shocks, 
and social “assistance,” or non-contributory transfers 
in cash or in-kind that are usually targeted at the poor 
and vulnerable.10 The top graph shows average ben-
efits per person by program and by quintile, while the 
bottom graph shows coverage (as percent of the eligi-
ble population). The figure shows a sharp regressivity 
of social insurance, by which the top quintile captures 
three times the benefits going to the lowest quintile. 
It also shows that social assistance is only mildly 
progressive, despite the coverage ratios being more 
so—with almost 45 percent of the bottom quintile being 
covered by some form of social assistance.
These results are not unusual. The higher average 
benefits that accrue from social insurance programs 
to the top quintile reflects the basic design of such 
programs to link benefits and contributions to income 
levels. Thus, higher wage earners pay more into social 
insurance schemes and correspondingly receive more. 
Looking at the lower panel, it is also clear that social 
assistance coverage declines with income, as is to be 
expected.
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Figure 4.  Average Causal Mediation Effects, Sensitivity to Violation of Sequential Ignorability
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Figure 5 reveals how hard it is to design steeply pro-
gressive programs. In social insurance, the only way 
to increase progressivity is to increase the coverage 
of lower quintile populations sharply, perhaps through 
designs that recognize and account for informality of 
the labor force—something that requires capacities 
that most states in poorer nations do not possess. In 
social assistance programs, by contrast, the absolute 
amounts of benefits are modest, often because they 
rely on general budgetary resources for which there 
are many competing demands.
We analyze the quantitative impact of the middle class 
on the distribution of benefits through a seemingly un-
related regression model that allows us to estimate the 
allocation to the top and bottom quintile at the same 
time. The results are presented in Table 4, in which 
average absolute benefits per capita to the bottom 
and top quintiles are estimated simultaneously by a 
common set of independent variables (including mid-
dle-class size), and where errors are allowed to co-
vary across equations. Middle-class size has a positive 
effect on total benefits accruing to the lowest and the 
top quintiles, but the effect on the top quintile is three 
times as strong as the effect on the lowest. When we 
examine effects on social assistance and social in-
surance separately, we see that a larger middle class 
boosts benefits to both groups but no longer has a sig-
nificant effect on social assistance benefits to the top 
quintile. The effect on social assistance to the poorest 
is quantitatively small; meanwhile, the middle-class 
effect on social insurance for the richest is eight times 
as strong, and four times as strong as the effect of so-
cial insurance to the poorest. We see strong evidence, 
from the foregoing, that although the middle class is 
boosting benefits to the poorest, it is enabling the lion’s 
share of benefits to be captured by the richest.
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Figure 5. Distribution of Per-Capita Social Benefits and Coverage by Quintile
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Total Benefits Social Assistance Social Insurance
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables: Bottom 
quintile
Top 
quintile
Bottom 
quintile
Top 
quintile
Bottom 
quintile
Top 
quintile
Middle-class headcount 0.014***(0.004)
0.037***
(0.010)
0.004***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
0.008***
(0.003)
0.032***
(0.011)
Polity score 0.027**
(0.012)
0.051
(0.031)
0.017***
(0.005)
0.010
(0.006)
0.017*
(0.010)
0.055
(0.034)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.115
(0.241)
-0.033
(0.643)
-0.022
(0.098)
-0.113
(0.120)
-0.099
(0.200)
0.018
(0.706)
Trade (% GDP) 0.008***
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.007)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.002
(0.001)
0.004**
(0.002)
-0.005
(0.007)
GDP per capita (Ln) -0.064
(0.108)
0.162
(0.290)
0.062
(0.049)
0.107*
(0.059)
-0.075
(0.089)
0.189
(0.315)
N 121 121 107 107 112 112
n 78 78 69 69 74 74
R2 0.657 0.565 0.556 0.245 0.629 0.533
Region-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Dependent variables are average benefits per person for the bottom quintile and for the top quintile by country (in 
2011 PPP-adjusted US dollars), estimated with seemingly unrelated regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. 
Intercepts are estimated but not reported.  * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 4. Benefits per Capita, Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
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CONCLUSION
Today’s developing countries have a higher inci-dence of extreme poverty than advanced econ-
omies did at equivalent income levels. The formation 
of welfare states in advanced, industrialized econo-
mies highlights the pivotal role of the growing middle 
class, following industrialization, in forming coalitions 
with the working poor to secure social benefits—the 
so-called “red-white” alliance. We examined the effect 
of middle-class size and social spending on poverty 
rates across richer and poorer countries, using data 
covering almost a century and a half. Our results show 
a strong, significant, and negative combined effect of 
middle-class size and social spending on poverty when 
controlling for average wealth and other country-spe-
cific factors. This effect, however, is diminishing in mid-
dle-class size; the larger the middle class, the smaller 
is the impact of social spending on reducing poverty.
Causal-mediation analysis confirms that the middle 
class has both a direct and indirect effect on reduc-
ing poverty, the latter being mediated through social 
spending. About half the impact of the middle class on 
poverty takes place because the middle class affects 
the size and composition of social programs. Given the 
inherent difficulties in identifying mediation channels in 
observational studies, we undertake a number of ro-
bustness checks that yield similar results.
An examination of the history of the red-white alliance, 
moreover, suggests that there is an inherent tension. 
A larger middle class supports more social spending, 
but it is also more likely to demand programs in which 
they benefit most. As the middle class grows, the mix 
of social programs shifts toward those whose benefits 
mostly accrue to the highest quintile (where most of 
the middle class in developing countries reside). Our 
results from estimates of the different components of 
social protection in today’s lower- and middle-income 
countries confirms this expectation. We find that a 
growing middle class expands transfers to the poor, 
but the benefits in terms of social insurance—which 
disproportionately benefit the upper quintiles in which 
the middle class in developing countries resides—in-
creases three times as fast. Coverage of social assis-
tance is progressive, but absolute amounts devoted to 
these programs are small and the incidence of benefits 
is neutral—similar absolute amounts accrue, on aver-
age, to people regardless of their place in the income 
distribution. By contrast, larger amounts are spent on 
social insurance, but the incidence of benefits is highly 
regressive. The role of the middle class is found to be 
significant in these trends. 
Our findings carry implications for the recent debate 
on the merits of targeting in anti-poverty programs 
versus a universal approach. Targeted programs have 
detractors. Identifying precisely who is and is not poor 
remains complicated due to unreliable data, imper-
fect information, and a lack of fiscal capacity in poor 
countries (Brown, Ravallion, and van de Walle 2016; 
Jhabvala and Standing 2010; Mkandawire 2005). 
Others have pointed out the ability of politicians to 
convert targeted programs into instruments of patron-
age (Schady 2000; Chisala and Hempill 2014). On the 
other hand, universal programs are far more costly, al-
though advocates of a universal or basic income guar-
antee argue that a fixed transfer to all adult citizens 
regardless of income can entail lower administrative 
costs while avoiding some of the distortions in incen-
tives associated with targeted transfers (Ravallion 
2016).11
Our results suggest that historically middle-class sup-
port is necessary for poverty reduction but limits the 
progressivity of such programs. New technologies, 
like cash transfers through mobile money, with very 
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low administrative costs could offer the possibility for 
breakthroughs in social assistance but they will have to 
be properly “marketed” to the middle class to counter-
act the often-widespread belief that poor households 
will misuse income transfers, and that welfare creates 
dependency (Harvey, 2007; Holmes and Jackson, 
2007). Indeed, this was one of the great achievements 
of conditional cash transfers. But there may be limits 
to such an approach. In many low- and middle-income 
countries, the growing middle class has little stake 
in a system of social assistance from which they are 
excluded (Subramanian 2013). In these countries, the 
middle classes send their children to private schools, 
use private healthcare, dig their own boreholes for 
water, and buy their own generators. That degree of 
middle-class exit means there are few demands by 
the middle classes to improve the public provision of 
services. In these cases, moving toward a universal 
system in which the middle class have a stake can 
potentially rebuild the “red-white,” cross-class alli-
ances. “Universalizing” social insurance by, for exam-
ple, changing eligibility rules in order to cover a larger 
proportion of those in the lower quintiles and ensuring 
that design includes the self-employed and those in the 
informal sector, could simultaneously secure critical 
middle-class support while providing greater gains for 
the poorest.
These two ideas—building support for a larger volume 
of social assistance and redesigning social insurance 
to reduce the degree of regressivity—have the poten-
tial to reduce extreme poverty sharply and sustainably 
if presented as a package that benefits both parts of 
the “red-white” alliance.
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ENDNOTES
1. This is to be expected, as contributions are also 
disproportionately made by the richest quintile.
2. In France, in contrast to the German case, the 
middle classes were more radicalized, and 
“white-collar unionism” was more widespread. 
According to Suh:  middle-class shopkeepers 
participated in the founding of the Confédéra-
cion Générale du Travail (CGT), traditionally 
under strong communist influence; postal work-
ers played an important role in the public-sector 
labor movement; white-collar workers participat-
ed in one of the first post-World War I general 
strikes; and even bank workers became union-
ized after 1919 (Suh 2002).
3. “Nonstandard jobs” refer to jobs that tend to be 
temporary, time-limited contracts, often part-
time, and offer limited job protections, such as 
from dismissal.
4. Note that income/consumption range is based 
on 2005 PPP adjustments. Under 2011 PPP ad-
justments, the gap is actually $11 to $110 per 
day.
5. Table 1 presents results using 5-year aver-
ages constructed from country-year incomes 
that are interpolated between years for which 
Bourguignon-Morrison data exist, and between 
survey years since 1980.  All results in Table 1 
are robust to the exclusion of interpolated coun-
try-years.
6. To avoid over-fitting by having too many instru-
ments, we limit lags of potentially endogenous 
variables to two.
7. In order to claim mediation, the treatment should 
precede and be significantly related to the out-
come and the mediator in the first two regres-
sions. In the third regression, the treatment and 
the mediator precede the outcome, the mediator 
is significantly related to the outcome, and the 
effect of the treatment has reduced or disap-
peared compared to the first regression. Indirect 
or mediation effects are captured by this reduc-
tion. Direct effects are treatment effects in the 
third regression.
8. We note that the effect of universalism on pov-
erty is negative, implying that targeting does not 
necessarily yield stronger effects on poverty re-
duction. Although countries at the lower end of 
the scale may have weak or non-existent social 
protection of any kind, the higher end of the uni-
versal welfare index implies a lack of targeting 
via means-testing or group-identity (Rasmussen 
2016).
9. We refer to the advanced, industrialized OECD 
members, i.e., excluding middle-income coun-
tries, countries that industrialized in the latter 
half of the 20th century (e.g., Israel and Korea), 
and the Eastern European states:  Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Ita-
ly, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the Unit-
ed States.
10. Social insurance includes publicly provided or 
mandated insurance schemes against old age, 
disability, death of the main household provider, 
maternity leave and sickness cash benefits, and 
social-health insurance. Social insurance pro-
grams are contributory and beneficiaries receive 
benefits or services in recognition of contribu-
tions to an insurance scheme.
11. A claim made by those recently proposing a uni-
versal basic income (UBI) scheme for India is 
that it will actually be more pro-poor than the ex-
isting collection of “leaky,” targeted anti-poverty 
programs. If the UBI replaces a series of poorly 
targeted subsidies, it can also remain budget 
neutral (Government of India 2017: 189-190).
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APPENDIX
This paper is built upon a database of coun-try-by-country estimations of the poor and the 
middle class that was formed as described below. For 
each country, data on the income distribution, mean 
household expenditure, and population are needed.
The dataset covers all countries and territories (like 
Kosovo and the West Bank and Gaza) for which these 
variables were found. This covers 165 countries, rep-
resenting 98 percent of the world’s population in 2015, 
96 percent of the world’s GDP, and 97 percent of total 
world household expenditure.1 
We assign countries to standard geographic groupings. 
Several clarifications: we assign Russia to Europe due 
to its population center lying much closer to Europe 
than Asia, Iran to the Middle East and North Africa, 
Australia and New Zealand to Asia Pacific, and Turkey 
to Europe in line with World Bank country groupings.
Our source for historical income distributions is 
Bourguignon Morrison 2002, who provide nearly 
global coverage from 1820 through 1990. From 1990 
onwards, we use distributional data from the house-
hold surveys included in the World Bank’s PovCalNet 
database. We supplement this in the case of four 
countries (New Zealand, South Korea, Zimbabwe, 
Myanmar) with household survey information available 
through the United Nations University World Institute 
for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
1  The following countries with a population greater than 1 million that are excluded from this study either because of an absence 
of survey data or household expenditure information, or both: Bahrain, Cuba, Eritrea, North Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates.
2  For countries with missing values for the mean, we use alternate sources. For Kiribati and Micronesia, we use current house-
hold final consumption expenditure in current LCU and then use the country-specific PPP conversion factor. For Papua New 
Guinea and Solomon Islands, we use the current Household Final Consumption Expenditure, PPP series and deflate to 2011 
dollars. We use the survey mean in the case of Samoa, Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu.
World Income Inequality Database (WIID). We use dis-
tributional data from household consumption surveys if 
available and household income surveys otherwise. In 
between years in which distributional data is available, 
we assume distributionally-neutral growth. 
When calculating the size of the middle class, we 
use household expenditure data that is derived from 
national accounts. Our primary source of data from 
1990 to 2015 is household expenditure in 2011 PPP 
terms taken from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database. We use GDP data from The 
Maddison Project Database as a guide to determine 
household expenditure in 2011 PPP from 1820 to 1990 
(Bolt and van Zanden 2014). Assuming that house-
hold expenditures and GDP grow at the same rate, we 
apply the GDP growth rate to the earliest household 
expenditure data available in WDI to estimate histor-
ical household expenditures. These values, divided 
by population, are used as the mean consumption 
level in each country.2 Use of national-accounts based 
household expenditure mean values helps overcome 
two problems. It imposes consistency across countries 
with household income surveys and those with house-
hold expenditure surveys. It also is one mechanism to 
distribute all sources of income to households within 
a country, thereby correcting for cross-country differ-
ences in the coverage of surveys, for example in the 
treatment of imputed housing services or self-employ-
ment income. This method is similar to that used by 
Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2016). 
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When calculating the number of people in extreme 
poverty, we use household expenditure means derived 
from household surveys instead of from national ac-
counts. National accounts tend to record higher con-
sumption than surveys, a pattern that is due in large 
part to consumption by wealthier households that are 
not captured by surveys.3 When the focus is on the 
upper end of the distribution, as when calculating the 
size of the middle class, it is preferable to use national 
account means because to do otherwise could re-
sult in significant amounts of household consumption 
being excluded from the analysis. However, surveys 
do effectively capture the bottom of the distribution, 
and survey non-response has little impact on poverty 
estimates (see for example Korinek, Mistiaen, and 
Ravallion 2006). We therefore use survey means in-
stead of national account means to estimate poverty. 
This follows the World Bank’s method for computing 
global poverty aggregates, which uses exclusively 
survey means (Ferreira et al 2015). As with the distri-
butional data, we use household consumption surveys 
if available. In years in which data is not available, we 
impute household expenditures in 2011 PPP based 
on the growth rate of GDP, as described above. 
Population from 1980 to 2015, finally, is taken from 
United Nations Population Division, while earlier popu-
lation data is from The Maddison Project. 
Computing Breakdown of Household 
Expenditure
We use a beta Lorenz specification using the cu-
mulative percent of population and of income from 
household surveys to estimate the full distribution of 
all households in each country. For estimation of distri-
3  See Deaton (2005) for an overview of the survey-national accounts discrepancy, and Bricker et al. (2016) for empirical evidence 
of missing top incomes in the United States.
butional parameters and beta-Lorenz functional forms, 
see Datt (1998). The most common alternative, the 
general quadratic specification, returned occasional 
negative values of people living below some thresh-
olds and so was rejected as an alternative. For each 
beta Lorenz curve, the survey mean was replaced by 
household expenditure per capita data drawn from the 
national accounts.
The latest household survey is used for each country 
in projections. 
Once the distributions are known, it is possible to com-
pute the percent of the population below any given 
threshold of expenditure using the following formula:
ΘHCRz (1–HCRz)
δ [                                         ] = 1 – μγ zHCRz
Y
HCRz
δ–             (1)
Where z corresponds to the thresholds ($1.90 a day for 
the extreme poor, and $11 to $110 a day for the middle 
class in constant 2011 PPP-adjusted dollars), µ corre-
sponds to the mean consumption per capita for a given 
country in a given year, and Θ, γ, and δ are parameters 
calculated from the cumulative percent of population 
and income of household surveys. See Datt (1998) for 
further explanation.
The headcount rate calculated based on z = 1.90 tells 
us directly the percent of the population living in ex-
treme poverty. To find the percent of the population 
in the middle class, we subtract the percent living be-
neath the $11 threshold from the percent living beneath 
the $110 threshold.
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